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Abstract
This paper is about an underappreciated aspect of generics: their non-specificity.Many
uses of generics, utterances like ‘Seagulls swoop down to steal food’, express non-
specific generalisations which do not specify their quantificational force or flavour. I
consider whether this non-specificity arises as a by-product of context-sensitivity or
semantic incompleteness but argue instead that generics semantically express non-
specific generalisations by default as a result of quantifying existentially over more
specific ones.
Keywords Generics · Genericity · Non-specificity · Propositional pluralism ·
Context-sensitivity · Semantic incompleteness
1 Introduction
Finding and articulating the conditions under which generics, sentences like Bus
drivers are grumpy or Bats have good hearing, are true or false has been the principal
undertaking in the generics literature. This is because it’s important, but also because
it’s difficult. It’s important because understanding the truth conditions of generics tells
us, at least in part, what they mean. And we should want to know what they mean.
An active research programme on generics has recently drawn attention to their cog-
nitive, political, and moral significance.
1
However, determining the truth-conditions
of generics has been difficult because the facts that make them true vary radically.
Generics can be true in virtue of facts about what most members of a kind are like,
1For instance, see Sarah Jane Leslie’s work on generics as articulating cognitively basic default gener-
alisations (2007, 2008, 2012) and that they act as vehicles of stereotyping (2015, 2017). On the latter, also
see Anderson et al (2012), McConnell-Ginet (2012), Haslanger (2011, 2014), Saul (2017), Ritchie (2019),
and Lemeire (2020).
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what they are disposed to be like, or even what they should be like, amongst others.2
In this paper, I propose a simple explanation of this fact: generics can be made true by
different kinds of facts because the generalisations they express are non-specific.
I start by articulating an assumption made implicitly in much of the literature
on generics: that generics express generalisations that are specific with respect to
quantificational force and flavour. I present a counterexample to this assumption: a
type of utterance which does not express any one specific, non-generic generalisation.
1.1 Non-specificity
All generalisations are non-specific in the sense that they are not about particular
members of a category. For example, All dogs bark or Most dogs bark are not about
any particular dogs.3 However, in this paper, I will argue that generics are non-specific
in a further sense: they do not specify the quantificational force or flavour of the link
between members of a kind and the property in question. While Most dogs bark
specifies a prevalence link between dogs and barking, the corresponding generic,
Dogs bark, does not further specify the nature of the link it posits between dogs and
barking.
I consider whether this non-specificity arises as a by-product of context-sensitivity
or semantic incompleteness, but argue instead that the propositions generics likeDogs
bark express are themselves weak generalisations that can be made true by facts of
different quantificational strengths and flavours, like the fact that most dogs bark, but
also other facts, such as that barking is characteristic of dogs, or that more dogs than
cats bark.
2 The specificity assumption and a counterexample
This paper is about generics, sentences like (1)–(3):4
(1) Rocking chairs are wooden
(2) Elks have antlers
(3) Brazilians are good football players
Although the literature on generics is young, there are plenty of theories about their
truth conditions. According to one popular approach, generics are universal general-
isations in disguise, quantifying over normal members of a kind.5 In contrast, Ariel
Cohen (1999a, 1999b) argues that generics are about what members of a kind are
2 For discussion of this feature, see Leslie (2008), Sterken (2015a), and Nguyen (2019).
3 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this journal for pointing out this further sense in which generics
are non-specific.
4 I focus my attention on bare-plural generics in English for the purposes of this paper. See Greenberg
(2004, 2007) for discussion of non-bare plural generics.
5 Theories of this type, albeit with various refinements, have been advocated by Dahl (1975), Delgrande




likely to be like.6 A different approach is taken by Sarah-Jane Leslie (2008, 2012),
who argues that generics are made true by different kinds of facts, depending on the
property they ascribe. Some generics are made true by facts about what’s true of most
members of a kind, others by facts about what’s characteristic of the kind, and yet
others by facts about what properties members of the kind are disposed to have.
One assumption these views generally make is that generics express fine-grained
generalisations: generalisations about what’s normal, what’s likely to be the case,
what’s characteristic, or what members of a kind are disposed to be like.7 On this
assumption, generics are not that different from other types of sentences that express
generalisations, at least not with regards to their meaning. Even though generics may
lack expressions like ‘all’ or ‘usually’ at the surface level, the generalisations they
express are not different in kind from those expressed by overtly quantified general-
isations: they are generalisations with a particular flavour and quantificational force.
So, whatever generalisations generics actually express, those generalisations are either
about what normal members of a kind are like, what members of a kind are likely to
be like, and so on. It’s this assumption I want to question by providing an example of
generics use which is not specific in that manner.
2.1 Seagulls
My friend Aoife and I are discussing things she doesn’t like about Aberdeen. So far,
Aoife has talked about the greyness, lack of sunlight, and bad city planning. Then she
says: ‘And what I hate most is the seagulls because we can’t eat anything outside.
Seagulls swoop down to steal food.’ The last part of Aoife’s remark is a generic, but
what type of generalisation does it express?
(4) Seagulls swoop down to steal food
(a) Most seagulls swoop down to steal food
(b) All normal seagulls swoop down to steal food
(c) All seagulls are disposed to swoop down to steal food
(d) More seagulls than other types of birds swoop down to steal food
(e) Swooping down to steal food is characteristic of seagulls
I will call (4a)–(4e) ‘candidate generalisations’. The assumption made in the views I
have described so far is that Aoife’s utterance expresses one candidate generalisation
or some other parsing of comparable specificity. However, I don’t think that it is at
all obvious that this is the case and that only the facts that would make true one of
(4a)–(4e) are what could make true Aoife’s utterance of (4).
First, decide on whichever parsing of (4) strikes you as the most plausible. Now,
imagine that that parsing was false, but that another of the candidate generalisations
6 According to Cohen, generics receive one of two readings. They can have absolute prevalence readings
in which case they are true iff the likelihood of a given relevant member of the kind having the property
in question is greater than 0.5. Alternatively, generics can receive a comparative reading, in which case
they are true iff the probability of a given member of the kind having some probability is higher than for a
member of a salient comparison kind.
7 Thematter is a little bitmore complicated for normalcy approaches in that they tend to include a contextual
parameter in the truth-conditions of generics. I will discuss contextualist accounts in Sect. 4.1 of this paper.
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was true. Would you want to say that Aoife’s utterance was, strictly speaking, false?
If not, then it seems like the assumption is unwarranted.
Second, sentences like (4) are often used to convey rough generalisations.Assuming
that assertions are typically used to express beliefs, is it plausible to think that the belief
Aoife expresses, and hence her communicative intention, must be as fine-grained as
the belief she would have expressed had she uttered one of (4a)–(4e)? It doesn’t seem
so to me. We often use generics to articulate rough generalisations, in this case about
seagulls and some behaviour that we think they in some general sense exhibit. Using
generics in this way just doesn’t require believing generalisations like (4a)–(4e).
This example is not an anomaly but an instance of a wider phenomenon. Much of
our use of generics is not specifically about normal members of a kind, what we take
to be the probability of a member of a kind having some property compared to some
comparison class, and so on. Instead, we use generics to articulate generalisations that
are not specific in this way. This paper is about understanding the non-specificity at
hand.
One initial thought might be that the context in which Aoife utters (4) matters.
Recently, accounts according to which sentences like (4) can convey different gener-
alisations dependingon the context inwhich they are uttered havegatheredmomentum.
Given that those espousing views of this kind tend to place an emphasis on the speaker’s
intentions, they might also have something to say about contexts in which speakers
appear to lack the fine-grained intentions that would be required to make one of
(4a)–(4e) be what Aoife’s utterance expressed.
And indeed, both Rachel Sterken (2015a) and Anthony Nguyen (2019), who have
emphasised flexibility in the use of generics across contexts, have discussed what they
call ‘underspecified’ or ‘indeterminate’ uses of generics. I will first outline their views
and the resources that come with them, before considering how they can be brought
to bear on non-specific uses of generics.
3 Token variability
Sterken and Nguyen distinguish between two different ways in which the generalisa-
tions conveyed by generic tokens appear to vary across contexts of utterance: in their
quantificational force and flavour.8
3.1 Quantificational force variability
Nguyen uses the following example:9
(5) Lottery tickets are losers
John needs money and asks Sally whether she thinks he should buy lottery tickets.
In response, Sally says: ‘No, lottery tickets are losers’. Nguyen argues that in the
8 While Sterken thinks that the variability concerns the truth-conditions of the generic tokens, Nguyen
thinks it occurs in the implicitures conveyed by them. I explain the difference in Sect. 4.
9 Example originally given in Sterken (2015a, p. 18) and developed by Nguyen (2019, p. 1305).
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context of Sally’s utterance, the generalisation the generic token conveys is true iff
most lottery tickets are losers. Contrast this with a different token of the same generic
type. Donald believes that the lottery is a big scam. He signs a contract, stating that
he’ll give any lottery winner a billion US dollars. His friend, who thinks this was a
stupid idea, objects. Donald defends himself by saying ‘Lottery tickets are losers’.
According to Nguyen, the generalisation conveyed by this generic token is true iff
all lottery tickets are losers and consequently, even for one and the same generic
sentence type, generalisations conveyed by different tokens of it can have different
truth-conditions.
This phenomenon is not specific to (5). Take the following example:
(6) Pizzas are in the freezer section
(6) can be used to make claims of varying quantificational force about pizzas and their
location. Imagine two supermarkets, one in which all the pizzas are in the freezer
section and another in which most are in the freezer section, but there are also some
in the fridge section. A customer comes into the first supermarket and asks a shop
assistant where to find pizzas. The shop assistant might utter (6) to make the claim
that all the pizzas are in the freezer section. However, if the customer instead went into
the second supermarket, a shop assistant there could use (6) to make a much weaker
claim, such that most or even just many pizzas are in the freezer section.
3.2 Flavour variability
Sterken gives examples in which the truth-conditions of utterances of one and the
same generic type appear to vary, not in their quantificational force, but the type of
generalisation they make.10 I call this variability ‘flavour variability’.
(7) Horses wear horseshoes
Sterken argues that (7)11 is true in some contexts and false in others. In the wild, no
horses wear horseshoes. They are not available and horses don’t need them. However,
it is plausible that, as a result of the size of the domesticated horse population, most
horses wear horseshoes.
Tokens of (7) asserted in a discussion ofmodern horse care are true.However, tokens
of (7) asserted contexts in which questions of evolutionary biology are salient, say in a
TV programme about evolutionary adaptations, are, according to Sterken, false.12 She
argues that this is because the truth conditions of tokens of (7) vary across contexts.
Tokens of (7) asserted in a modern horse care context, say in a conversation between
horse breeders, are true iff most horses wear horseshoes. Tokens of (7) asserted in an
evolutionary biology context are true iff horses naturally wear horseshoes. Since the
10 Sterken (2015a, pp. 6–7).
11 Sterken actually uses the much more widely discussed example of Dobermanns have pointy ears intro-
duced by Nickel (2008). It is possibly no longer the case that most dobermans have their ears clipped.
Because the example as presented relies on some prevalence claim being true, I use (7) instead. The con-
siderations are analogous.
12 Nguyen (2019, p. 1306) gives some further examples of this kind.
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former is the case and the latter isn’t, tokens of (7) are, Sterken argues, true in some
contexts and false in others.13
I do think that the examples given by Sterken and Nguyen pick up on a variability
in use, though whether that variability is truth-conditional or of a different kind is a
question I want to postpone until Sects. 7 and 8. Even though Sterken and Nguyen
seem to assume that many of the tokens they use in their examples are specific enough
to trigger the changes in truth-value judgements in question, both also discuss non-
specific uses of generics. As they take non-specificity to arise out of token variability,
we need to first understand how they explain the latter to understand how they make
sense of the former.
4 Explaining token variability
Sterken and Nguyen explain token variability by positing contextualism and semantic
incompleteness respectively.
4.1 Contextualism
Sterken uses the observations about token variability tomotivate an account, according
to which generics are context-sensitive. She argues that an unpronounced quantifier
generics are often thought to contain, Gen, is context-sensitive.14 Following Jeffrey
King (2013), Sterken argues that Gen is a supplementive. Supplementives are context-
sensitive expressions, which, in addition to their context-invariant meaning and the
context of utterance, require that speakers intend to convey a certain content and that
this intention is accessible to an attentive, reasonable hearer who knows the common
ground of the conversation. For example, the semantic values of demonstratives like
‘that’ or pronouns like ‘her’ depend on the intentions of the speaker, in addition to
their context-invariant meaning and other features of the context.
As the intentions of speakers vary across contexts of utterance, both the flavour
and quantificational force of Gen do too. For example, speaker intentions, according
to Sterken, can make it such that a token of (4), Seagulls swoop down to steal food,
expresses the claim that most seagulls swoop down to steal food in one context,
whereas another utterance of (4) expresses the claim that seagulls are more likely to
swoop down to steal food than other salient kinds of bird. According to contextualism
then, the truth conditions of generics vary across tokens, depending on certain features
of the contexts of utterance, notably the speaker’s intentions. An approach I consider
next explains variability not in terms of the generics being context-sensitive, but in
terms of them being semantically incomplete.
13 Another kind of notable type of flavour variability is discussed in Leslie (2015) who considers cases
in which utterances of a generic can have a normative flavour in one context and a descriptive flavour in
another.
14 Sterken’s account is just one way of implementing contextualism about generics. For example, most of




Nguyen (2019) proposes that generics are semantically incomplete. He utilises Kent
Bach’s notion of propositional radicals to articulate his proposal. A propositional
radical is a structured propositionmissing at least one of its constituents. Consequently,
the would-be proposition has a gap. By themselves, the sentences that express the
propositional radicals lack truth-values. However, they can be completed by speaker
intentions. For example, ‘It is raining’ doesn’t, in itself, express a full proposition,
but can be used by a speaker to make the claim that it is raining in São Paulo, as
long as the speaker has the relevant communicative intention.15 According to Bach,
the completed content is not the semantic value of the utterance but is communicated
pragmatically as an impliciture.16
In contrast to contextualism, completed tokens do not have full propositions as
their semantic value, but express them pragmatically. Whereas for contextualists, the
semantic value of tokens varies across contexts of utterances, for Nguyen, the semantic
content stays the same. Instead, it is pragmatically communicated content that varies
depending on the speaker’s intentions that complete propositional radicals in one way
or another.
Applied to generics, the idea is that the generic types themselves do not have
truth-values as they, in isolation, express propositional radicals which are not truth-
apt. Nevertheless, generic tokens can be completed by speaker intentions, in which
case they communicate complete generalisations of varying quantificational force and
flavour via implicitures. For example, in one context, the speaker uttering (4) completes
the propositional radical in such a way so as to convey that most seagulls swoop down
to steal food, whereas in another, the same propositional radical can be completed
by different intentions so as to convey the claim that more seagulls than other birds
engage in this kind of behaviour.
4.3 Non-specificity as a by-product
Both those that posit contextualism and those that posit semantic incompleteness in
their accounts of generics emphasise the contexts of utterance and, in particular, the
intentions of speakers to explain the content of generics utterances. This emphasis
also means that they have the resources to understand non-specific uses of generics as
uses that arise out of a certain kind of context of utterance, namely one that lacks those
intentions or other ingredients that determine one specific generalisation as what is
communicated by a generic token.17 Following Kai von Fintel and Anthony Gillies
(2011), who discuss related issues surrounding epistemic modals, I will call such
contexts ‘indeterminate contexts’.
15 Bach (2006, p. 436).
16 An impliciture is content that is conveyed pragmatically, much like a Gricean implicature, but more
closely related to the semantic content of the utterance. See Bach (1994).
17 Alternatively, the relevant contexts may contain conflicting ingredients. I ignore such cases for the sake
of brevity, but the considerations that apply to them are similar.
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In describing the type of context, Sterken says:
The speaker needn’t intend that a determinate generalisation is expressed by
Gen. The conversation may not demand this, rather the speaker might simply
intend some range of generalisations, so long as the speaker and hearer manage
to coordinate on or attend to an appropriate generalisation. (Or, an appropriate
range of quantifiers that act as the quantificational force, and an appropriate
range of properties that can act as the domain) (2015a, pp. 21–22).18
Both Nguyen and Sterken use the term ‘indeterminate’ to describe utterances of gener-
ics like Aoife’s, although Sterken also describes them as ‘underspecified’. I think that
it is important to distinguish these. The two options on the table are that either:
(a) The generic tokens express one candidate generalisation, but it is indeterminate,
in that there is no fact of the matter about which one it is.
(b) The generic tokens express non-specific or ‘underspecified’ generalisations
I believe that option (a) is implausible. First, picking any one of the candidate gener-
alisations over the others is arbitrary. Second, if the speaker doesn’t intend any one
candidate generalisation to be communicated and the context lacks other ingredients
to do the job then why believe that any one non-generic generalisation is actually
expressed? I return to this worry later on in this paper. Instead, I want to explore
option (b), according to which the content expressed by Aoife’s utterance itself is
non-specific, for the remainder of this paper. How can Sterken and Nguyen account
for non-specific generic tokens? I will consider two options: that they convey no
propositions or that they convey several.
5 Pragmatic explanations of non-specificity
5.1 No propositions
If generics rely on some features of the context in which they are uttered for their
meaning, whether through context-sensitivity or semantic incompleteness, then, if
those features are lacking, we might think that those tokens just don’t express any
propositions. Maybe generic tokens, at least those uttered in indeterminate contexts,
just aren’t the kind of sentences that express truth-evaluable, complete propositions?
I will call this view ‘propositional nihilism’.
Both contextualism and semantic incompleteness theories are compatible with
propositional nihilism, given additional assumptions. I focus on what explanation
the semantic incompleteness proponent could give. According to Nguyen, the propo-
sitional radicals that generics express need to be completed by speaker intentions in
order to convey full propositions via implicitures. Thus, if the speakers lack those
fine-grained intentions that would complete the propositional radicals, then no full
18 Nguyen (2019, p. 1315) also discusses non-specific uses of generics. He considers whether it is a
counterexample to his view that it allows such ‘indeterminate’ uses of generics as a result of speakers not
intending any one way in which the propositional radical is to be completed. Rightly, in my view, he points
out that such uses of generics are common and thus that their possibility is not a point of criticism.
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proposition at all is conveyed. So, in our example, if Aoife lacks the fine-grained
intentions usually required to communicate overtly quantified generalisations, then
no such generalisations can be conveyed.
However, this raises questions about howher utterance can bemeaningful. If generic
tokens themselves only express propositional radicals, any truth-apt generalisations
must be conveyed via implicitures. But these implicitures require that speakers have
fine-grained intentions to complete the propositional radicals in one of several ways.
When they don’t, it is unclear howany propositions could be conveyed via implicitures.
Tokens of other examples of supposed propositional radicals that are not completed
by speaker intentions have a distinct incomplete feel to them. For example, if I say
‘It is raining’ with no intention of conveying that it is raining in any one location,
then whatever meaning I did convey has a distinct, incomplete feel to it. However,
utterances like Aoife’s do not have such an incomplete feel.19 If I utter ‘Dogs bark’
without intending to make a claim that is specifically about, say, prevalence or what’s
characteristic for dogs, then that generalisation may be rough, but not incomplete in
the sense that my utterance of ‘It is raining’ is.20
Given the role generic tokens expressing rough generalisations play in our everyday
life, it would seem strange if nothing they said (either semantically or via implicitures)
was truth-evaluable and we would need a reason for why they are used in this way.
Consequently, Iwill explore an alternative response, namely that generic tokens uttered
in indeterminate contexts do express propositions, in fact, that they express several.
5.2 Several propositions
Propositional pluralism is the view that some utterances express several propositions.
Applied to the case of generics, the idea would be that at least some generic tokens
express several propositions, corresponding to the candidate generalisations. Emanuel
Viebahn (2019) distinguishes between two types of propositional pluralism: strong
and flexible pluralism. Both entail the claim that some sentences express sets con-
taining several propositions, but they differ in whether the pluralism comes about as
19 Recanati (2004) discusses utterances of this type (actually including utterances of ‘It is raining’) as a
reason against thinking of the relevant sentences as semantically incomplete by employing what he calls
an ‘optionality criterion’. His idea is that when sentences can be used to express what seem like complete
propositions in indeterminate contexts, this is a sign that they are not semantically incomplete. My point
here is not just that generics aren’t semantically incomplete, but rather that even if they were we would need
an explanation of how the truth-evaluable content would be communicated pragmatically in the absence of
specific communicative intentions.
20 In response, an anonymous reviewer for this journal suggests that indeterminate contexts already contain
a lot of common ground about the kind and properties in question and that these background assumptions in
some way fill in the meaning such that the utterances sound less incomplete. If we instead consider generic
utterances about made up kinds and properties, like Harpies flibbet, these utterances might have more of
an incomplete feel to them than the case I consider.I agree. However, the question for me is not whether
extra content is communicated through the interaction of the content communicated and prior beliefs, but
how this is done. If it is done through implicitures, then we need an account of how these are generated by
non-specific communicative intentions. If they are not communicated through implicitures, but for instance,
implicatures, then we come back to the idea that by itself, my utterance of ‘Dogs bark’ appears to say much




a result of the sentence containing context-sensitive expressions (flexible pluralism)
or semantically incomplete expressions (strong pluralism). This means that pluralism
is compatible with both contextualism and semantic incompleteness theories. I will
be focusing on flexible pluralism here, but analogous considerations apply for strong
pluralism.
According to flexible pluralism, sentences that include context-sensitive expres-
sions express a set containing several propositions when uttered in indeterminate
contexts. To my knowledge, no-one has yet proposed such an account for generics.
According to flexible pluralism about generics, generic tokens uttered in indeterminate
contexts express several non-generic generalisations. Generic tokens always express
a set of propositions, but this set can contain more than one element when uttered in
indeterminate contexts.
Pluralism does a good job of explaining non-specific uses of generics. Generic
tokens uttered in indeterminate contexts don’t just express one fine-grained general-
isation, they actually express several. We don’t need to choose between the different
candidate generalisations Aoife’s utterance might have expressed, because it actually
expressed all contextually salient ones. Pluralism gives, at least at first sight, a straight-
forward account of what contents Aoife’s utterance conveys in terms that posit things
most already accept: sets and propositions.21
Propositional pluralism has its advantages, but it also comes with some costs that
speak in favour of finding an alternative approach. Propositions are posited not just
as semantic values of sentences, but also, for example, as the objects of propositional
attitudes. To emphasise one such attitude in particular, consider generic beliefs. What
we believe when we believe, or even know, that bats have good hearing, seems to
be quite different from what we believe when we believe that most bats have good
hearing, with regards to what evidence our beliefs require, but also what other beliefs
and actions they give rise to. Does believing that bats have good hearing really require
having a host of fine-grained beliefs about bats and having good hearing?What norms
govern them? Are they only properly expressed as assertions if we meet epistemic
requirements for all the propositions they convey? I believe that the fact that generic
beliefs are non-specific can explain some of the differences between them and beliefs
in other generalisations, making it all the more important that we understand the
source of their non-specificity. Adopting propositional pluralism, and nihilism for that
matter, comes with a large amount of extra work involved in modifying theories that
rely on sentences only expressing one proposition at a time or coming up with new
ones.
However, there is also another concern that I have already anticipated in my dis-
cussion of Sterken’s analysis. If communicative intentions are necessary for giving
context-sensitive expressions their meaning, as is the case with supplementives, lack-
ing the communicative intentions required for those expressions to have a given
21 Another benefit of propositional pluralism is that it provides a unified account of non-specificity that can
arise from sentences with different kinds of context-sensitive expressions being uttered in indeterminate
contexts. For instance, Sterken (2015a) compares these uses of generics to non-specific uses of ‘here’ in
which speakers can leave open how big an area they are referring to. Propositional pluralism can account
for such similarities, simply by including ‘here’ and other expressions like it, in the group of expressions
which can have several semantic values when used in indeterminate contexts.
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meaning, should make it impossible for the expression to have that meaning.22 Given
that Aoife utters (4) without having intentions to convey any one non-generic generali-
sation, it just seems unmotivated to think that her utterance communicates any of those
candidate generalisations, much less several of them. These considerations illustrate
that while propositional pluralism has the resources to account for non-specific uses
of generics, it also brings with it complications. In the last section, I therefore want to
propose an alternative that avoids such complications: the idea that generics express
one proposition at a time, just a non-specific one.
6 The generality account
6.1 The basic idea
My proposal is this: rather than assume that generics generally express fine-grained
generalisations, they, by default, express coarse-grained generalisations.Generics gen-
eralise about members of a kind and attribute a link between them and some property,
but they need not saymuch about the nature of that link. In contrast to the explanations I
considered in the previous section, the generality account understands non-specificity
not as a by-product of context-sensitivity or semantic incompleteness, but instead
simply as a feature of the semantic content of generics.23
Though the idea that generics express non-specific generalisations hasn’t been
widely discussed in the generics literature, the idea behind it is actually somewhat
obvious.24 Generics lack overt quantifier expressions. If quantifier expressions in sen-
tences that express generalisations determine which such generalisations they express,
22 In response, an anonymous reviewer for this journal suggests that the relevant contexts should be thought
of not as lacking the relevant ingredients, but instead as containing them by default. The idea would then
be that several fine-grained generalisations are communicated as long as they are not in conflict with the
speaker’s intention. One worry about this strategy would be that it would entail that one would often say
more, semantically or via implicitures, by speaking generally than if one was more specific.
23 An anonymous reviewer for this journal suggests that contextualists can argue that generics uttered in
indeterminate contexts do express weak propositions as a result of existential closure, without needing to
posit non-specificity separately. Existential closure is a process whereby variables that would otherwise be
free are existentially bound (Heim, 1982). My best guess of what such an account would look like is as
follows: Where generics are uttered in indeterminate contexts, whatever values Gen is compatible with in
the context would be existentially quantified over. The main difference between this account and the one
I describe on this page is that it would be a process that is not triggered generally, but only when generics
are uttered in indeterminate contexts.I do actually agree that existential closure might be what gives rise to
non-specificity, albeit triggered by an absence of an overt quantifier expression at the surface level, not the
context of utterance. Two important questions that bear on this matter are: First, for this proposal to not be
ad-hoc, existential closure is something that should occur with any expressions that are context-sensitive/
semantically incomplete when they are uttered in indeterminate contexts. The proposal for generics would
depend on whether this is a plausible general strategy. Second, I will suggest that context-sensitivity may
not be needed to account for token variability of the kind that motivates contextualists in the next few pages,
in which case we might take non-specificity as a theoretical starting point and do without contextualism.
24 Themost similar other accounts I am aware of are byNickel (2016)who argues that generics existentially
quantify over ways of being normal, Carlson (2008) who argues that generics quantify existentially over
inductive patterns, Greenberg (2004, 2007) who argues that they are vague, and Lemeire (2020) who argues
that they express disjunctive generalisations.
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then it doesn’t seem far-fetched to think that sentences that lack quantifier expressions
express less restricted generalisations. So how do generics encode non-specificity
semantically?
According to the generality account, generics encode non-specificity by existen-
tially quantifying over non-generic generalisations concerning the kind and property
in question.25 So, Aoife’s utterance existentially quantifies over non-generic general-
isations concerning seagulls and the swooping down to steal food: that most seagulls
do it, that more seagulls than other types of bird do it, that it is normal for them to do so,
and so on. Consequently, (4) is true as long as at least one non-generic generalisation
about seagulls swooping down to steal food is true.
Generic generalisations still generalise about members of a kind by linking it to
some property but are less specific about the nature of that link than non-generic
generalisations. Not just any kind of link between the kind and property in question
will do, however. For example, if most seagulls were scared of swooping down to steal
food and none ever in any sense did it, this would not suffice to make (4) true. Instead,
the domain of generalisations about seagulls that are eligible to make true the generic
needs to be restricted.
6.2 The domain of quantification
Exactly which non-generic generalisations generics quantify over is not a matter I can
or want to stipulate at this point. Doing so would require empirical work that hasn’t
yet, as far as I am aware, been undertaken. What is needed is experimental testing
of which non-generic generalisations speakers take to make true the corresponding
generics. These seem likely to me to include those generalisations in terms of which
generics have been analysed: claims about what’s normal for members of a kind,
probability claims (both absolute and comparative), claims about what dispositions
members of a kind have, claims about the essence of members of a kind, and perhaps
claims about what norms members of a kind are subject to. However, in the absence of
adequate data, it would be premature to limit which non-generic generalisations can
feature in the domain of quantification.
However, some, to my mind plausible hypotheses for restriction have been given
by Prasada and Dillingham (2006) and Nickel (2016), who emphasise the importance
of explanation in what can make true generics. For example, we might think that for
(7) to be made true, it needs to be the case that being a horse in some way explains the
wearing of horseshoes. Nickel (2016) in particular, emphasises that different types of
links can be explanatory depending on the type of inquiry in which one is engaged,
which would explain the variety in non-generic generalisations that can make true a
generic.
One thing that is important to point out is that each of the generalisations generics
quantify over existentially can themselves be non-specific to varying degrees. Some
25 While I talk about generics as quantifying existentially over a domain of non-generic generalisations for
the remainder of this article, I remain neutral here as to how this quantificational force arises. See Sterken
(2016) for arguments in favour of quantificational approaches that posit a covert quantifier and Liebesman
(2001), Cohen (2012), and Collins (2018) for alternative, pragmatic explanations.
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generalisations contain a lot of information about the nature of the link they ascribe,
some very little, and most are somewhere in between. What is important for my
purposes is that the generalisations in questionmust bemorefine-grained than generics
in that they specify more of the flavour or quantificational force of the link between
the kind and property in question.
(8) 87% of Scots are vitamin D deficient
(9) Most Scots are vitamin D deficient
(10) Many Scots are vitamin D deficient
For example, (8) is a generalisation about Scottish people and vitamin D deficiency.
The generalisation is more specific than (9), which in turn is more specific than (10).
The less specific the generalisation, the less information is specified about the nature of
the link it posits between a kind and a property. The idea now is that generics are at the
non-specific end of the specificity scale for generalisations: they are the non-specific
counterparts to other generalisations.
The generality account can explain non-specificity in generics without needing
to pose phenomena like context-sensitivity or semantic incompleteness simply as a
feature of their semantic content. The view also has other advantages: it can provide the
resources for a straightforward picture of generic beliefs, explain the varying strength
of negated generics in terms of scope ambiguities, and may be able to explain why
generic sentences are, as sentences featuring other non-specific expressions, associated
with particular types of tense, aspect, and mood.26 Much else needs to be said to
develop this approach and expand on these advantages, however, I want to end by
responding to what I expect will be the most pressing objection to it: doesn’t the
generality account overgenerate true generics?
7 Overgeneration
According to the generality account, as long as one of a set containing several non-
generic generalisations about the kind and property in question is true, so is the generic.
However, there are many cases in which a non-generic generalisation about a kind and
property is true, but the corresponding generic seems false.
For example, consider the widely discussed case of:
(11) Books are paperbacks
Even though most books are paperbacks, utterances of (11) still sound strange and,
to some, simply false.27 However, according to the generality account, (11) should be
true because most books are paperbacks. The problem isn’t just limited to sentences
like (11), but also arises in a more limited form about generic tokens in particular
contexts of utterance. What led Sterken and Nguyen to posit context-sensitivity or
semantic incompleteness was the observation that tokens of generics appear to express
different generalisations across contexts of utterance. But in its invariant version, the
26 See Frawley (2013, pp. 69–74) on grammaticalmarkers of non-specificity andDahl (1995) andChierchia
(1995) on such markers in generics.
27 For example, Leslie (2008).
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generality account predicts that the truth-conditions of generics are stable because
they existentially quantify over the same set of non-generic generalisations.
7.1 Contextualism to the rescue?
One straightforwardway ofwarding off both theseworries is to combine the generality
account and contextualism. Instead of arguing that generics existentially quantify
over the same set of non-generic generalisations across all contexts of utterance, they
might instead quantify over a contextually restricted set of them. Such an account
could explain token variability in the same way other contextualist accounts do, while
giving a straightforward answer to the question about the propositional content of
non-specific generic tokens.
The contextualist picture would be as follows: generic sentence types are highly
non-specific. They simply say that at least one contextually salient non-generic gener-
alisation about members of the kind and the property in question is true, but little more
about the nature of that generalisation. When generic types are tokened, their level
of specificity depends on the contexts in which they are uttered. The less restrictive a
context is, the more flavours and strengths of association are salient and, hence, the
less specific the content of the generic token.
The contextualist version of the generality account has a response to overgeneration
worries. Many of the generic tokens that the invariant version of the generality account
would controversially predict to be true, could be false according to the contextual-
ist version simply because the non-generic generalisation that is true would not be
contextually salient. It can also account for token variability in the standard way con-
textualists do. A generic can be used to convey a generalisation of a particular flavour
or quantificational force in one context. Yet in another context, the same generic type
could be used to express a generalisation of a different flavour or force because the
domain of quantification would contain different non-generic generalisations for the
generic to quantify over.
7.2 Embracing true generics
The contextualist viewwould alleviate some of the urgency of overgeneration worries,
at least initially. However, I don’t think that this is a conclusive point in its favour for
three reasons: the relief it provides is temporary, it is not clear that accepting many
generics as true is something we should avoid, and accepting them as true doesn’t
preclude us from explaining why utterances of them can sound bad.
First, the overgeneration problem simply resurfaces for the contextualist as a
metasemantic question about why a given non-generic generalisation cannot be salient
in a given context.Why can’t we utter (11) intending tomake the claim thatmost books
are paperbacks and thereby convey it?
Second, the existing evidence we have about the intuitions speakers have about
many of the generics assumed to be straightforwardly false, is quite limited. The
studies we do have show a complicated picture with regards to people’s truth-value
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judgements.28 Even within the generics literature, there is disagreement about the
truth-conditions of some generics. For example, Krifka et al. (1995) assume that it
is important to make sure a theory of generics doesn’t predict that Children born in
Rainbow Lake are right-handed is true. However, Wasserman (2011) casts doubt on
this assumption. Likewise, Leslie (2007, 2008) assumes that Sharks attack bathers is
true, whereas Sterken (2015b) argues that it, and a class of other generics Leslie takes
to be true, are actually false. Specifically, with regards to (11), Books are paperbacks,
Leslie (2008) assumes that it is false, whereas Nickel (2018) argues that it is not.
For several reasons then, more evidence is required to substantiate the idea that the
relevant generics are actually false before being concerned that the generality account
or other non-specificity approaches, overgenerate true generics. These considerations
may do something to lessen the force of worries about overgeneration with regards
to sentences like (11). But what about the ability to explain the observations of what
looks like variability in the truth-conditions of generic tokens?
In the last section of this paper, I will argue that we can explain the ways in which
generics can be used to convey a variety of more specific generalisations, even if their
truth-conditions are stable and non-specific. Even though generic tokens semantically
express non-specific generalisations, they, in addition, convey more specific general-
isations through pragmatic means. So, the examples Sterken and Nguyen cite are not
instances of truth-conditional variability, but of variability in use made possible by the
pragmatic effects of generic tokens.
8 Pragmatic effects
Non-specific language can convey more specific contents by means of its pragmatic
effects.Wecanuse generics to semantically express non-specific generalisationswhich
interact with cognitive biases, prior beliefs, and conversational expectations to cause
beliefs in more specific generalisations. Going back to the seagull example, even if
(4) doesn’t semantically tell us which non-generic generalisation(s) make(s) it true,
this doesn’t preclude non-semantic factors from causing me to form just such beliefs.
Depending on my background assumptions about seagulls, beliefs about the topic of
conversation, or cognitive biases, I might well form additional beliefs about which
proper subset of generalisations, or even which individual generalisations are respon-
sible for making (4) true on the basis of Aoife’s utterance.
To develop this line of argument, we can make use of an existing literature on the
implicatures generic utterances generate. Sally Haslanger (2011, 2014) argues that
most generic tokens produce distinctive conversational implicatures.29 She argues
28 For example, a detailed study by Prasada et al. (2013), which asked participants to judge the truth-values
of generic sentences, shows quite a mixed picture. Most of the supposedly false generics don’t receive
strong falsity scores. For example,(11), Books are paperbacks, received a mean score of 0.21 on a scale of
– 3 to + 3, where – 3 was definitely false and + 3 definitely true. Even those generics that were judged
as more false than true didn’t receive strong scores. For example, the mean scores for the two types of
supposedly false generics (those in which the majority of members have the property and those in which
only a minority do) were 0.21 and – 0.52 respectively.
29 For Haslanger (2014, p. 15), utterances of what she calls ‘statistical generics’ do not generate the relevant
implicatures. Because I think that generics are non-specific, I think the lack of relevant implicatures for
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that cognitive biases lead us to expect that generalisations about members of a kind
and a property are made true by essences shared bymembers of the kind, which in turn
give rise to expectations that they should exhibit the property. For instance, hearing that
seagulls swoop down to steal people’s food may lead us to believe that seagulls have
some underlying essence that grounds other, e.g., prevalence generalisations about
them, and even gives rise to normative expectations about seagulls, such as that a
proper seagull ought to behave in this manner.30
Other important implicatures generated by generic tokens depend less on general
normative or essentialist biases, and more on prior beliefs about the relevant kinds
and properties, or general conversational relevance expectations.31 First, prior beliefs
about which non-generic generalisations are not true can restrict the domain of gener-
alisations that interlocutors think of as likely contenders for making true a generic. For
example, most participants in conversations in which (7), Horses wear horseshoes,
is uttered know that horses don’t naturally wear horseshoes which restricts the set of
non-generic generalisations that they think could make true (7). Second, when a con-
text is such that only a proper subset of non-generic generalisations would be relevant,
uttering a generic implicates that it is one of those non-generic generalisations in the
restricted set that makes the generic token true.
Because of this interaction between relevance expectations and prior beliefs, speak-
ers can use generics to pragmatically convey more specific generalisations. Even
though generics don’t, according to the generality account, have a strong semantic
meaning, they can nevertheless pragmatically communicate that a given generic is
true in virtue of a restricted subset of generalisations about a kind and property. This
account of the pragmatic effects of generic utterances can explain both the appearance
of token variability and why some generics the generality account predicts are true
may nevertheless sound bad to us.
For example, in a conversation between horse breeders about horse-care related
budgets, an utterance of (7),Horses wear horseshoes,may generate implicatures about
the prevalence of horseshoe-wearing amonghorses or perhaps a normative requirement
for them to do so, but likely none about how horses have evolved. In contrast, in a
context in which two evolutionary biologists are discussing the various adaptations
horses have undertaken in response to their environment, uttering (7) would likely
generate the implicature that horses naturally wear horseshoes. Such an utterance
would sound strange, not because it is false, but because the generalisation that does
make it true is not of the kind that is relevant in the context of utterance and the
generalisation that would be relevant is false.
Footnote 29 continued
some generics needs to be accounted for by extra-semantic factors, for example, additional beliefs about
the kind and property in question.
30 Haslanger’s argument connects to a literature by Susan Gelman and various co-authors who have drawn
attention to what they call the essentialising effects of generics, i.e., the tendency of generics to lead us to
expect that more superficial properties are grounded in essences shared by members of a kind. See Gelman
et al (2010), Leslie (2014), Cimpian et al. (2010), Gelman (2003).This phenomenon might also be a feature
of non-generic generalisations. See Hoicka et al. (2018) and Munton (2019).
31 For related work on generic implicatures, see Saul (2017) who describes how expectations concerning
relevance can make generic tokens sound infelicitous when the link they posit is irrelevant as well as
Rosola (2019) who argues that generics convey particularised conversational implicatures depending on
the investigative aims of a context.
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Generics provide particularly fertile grounds for implicatures because of their weak
semantic contents.Bypositing a connectionbetweenkinds andproperties, theyprovide
enough contents to interact with cognitive biases, prior beliefs, and conversational
relevance expectations. At the same time, what they semantically express is non-
specific enough to be compatible with many possible implicatures and thereby allows
them to be generated. In this way, the generality account can explain the semantic
basis that facilitates pragmatic effects in generic tokens.
There is much further work to be done in identifying the underlying cognitive and
pragmatic mechanisms that generate generic implicatures and the ways they interact.
However, at least for now, it seems that there are pragmatic resources available to the
proponent of the generality account that lets them address overgeneration worries and
explain use variability without requiring contextualism.
9 Conclusion
I have drawn attention to what I take to be an underappreciated aspect of generics: their
non-specificity. I considered views according to which non-specificity occurs as a by-
product of contextualism or semantic incompleteness but argued that these approaches
commit us to propositional nihilism or pluralism, both of which are undesirable and
unnecessary. Instead, I proposed a novel account, according towhich generics quantify
existentially over non-generic generalisations. According to the generality account,
non-specificity is a feature of the semantic content of generic sentences. A generic is
true as long as one of several non-generic generalisations about the kind and property
in question is. I’ve provided an initial defence of the account against the worry that
it overgenerates true generics and argued that though generics semantically express
weak generalisations, their pragmatic effects are anything but.
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